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Abstract
Large retailers, enjoying substantial market power in some local markets, often compete
with smaller retailers who carry a narrower range of products in a more efficient way. We
find that these large retailers can exercise their market power by adopting a loss-leading
pricing strategy, which consists of pricing below cost some of the products also offered by
smaller rivals, and raising the prices on the other products. In this way, the large retailers
can better discriminate multi-stop shoppers from one-stop shoppers — and may even earn
more profit than in the absence of the more efficient rivals. Loss leading thus appears as an
exploitative device, designed to extract additional surplus from multi-stop shoppers, rather
than as an exclusionary instrument to foreclose the market, although the small rivals are hurt
as a by-product of exploitation. We show further that banning below-cost pricing increases
consumer surplus, small rivals’ profits, and social welfare. Our insights apply generally to
industries where a firm, enjoying substantial market power in one segment, competes with
more efficient rivals in other segments, and procuring these products from the same supplier
generates customer-specific benefits. They also apply to complementary products, such as
platforms and applications. There as well, our analysis provides a rationale for below-cost
pricing based on exploitation rather than exclusion.
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1 Introduction
The last three decades have seen the emergence of large retailers that offer a full range of gro-
ceries and other goods to attract consumers through one-stop shopping, as well as an increased
concentration in retail markets. As a result, in many local retail markets there is limited compe-
tition among large retailers, who have substantial market power over parts of the product lines1
and compete mainly with smaller stores, such as hard-discounters and specialist retailers, who
carry much narrower product lines but may be more efficient in delivering these goods.2 This
raises a concern that large retailers may impede competition by leveraging their market power
into the product segments that are also served by their smaller rivals.3
Large grocery retailers are able to exercise their market power in two ways, namely, through
buyer power against suppliers or seller power against consumers and smaller rivals.4 While
most of the recent literature has focused on buyer power,5 relatively little attention has been
1 For instance, in its assessment of local market concentration in grocery retailing, the UK Competition Com-
mission (2008, Section 6) defines highly-concentrated local markets as "local markets with three or fewer fascia in
total where one of those fascia had a share of local grocery sales area that is greater than 60 per cent within a
10- or 15 minute drive-time." It finds that 27% of larger grocery stores are located in highly-concentrated local
markets within a 10-minute drive time. The Commission finds moreover that the impact on a large retailer’s
profit from another large retailer is less than 4%, and that from small retailers is statistically insignificant; see
Competition Commission (2008), Appendix 4.4 at § 47.
2 The rise of the hard-discount format is a new landscape in grocery-retailing. Hard discounters, popularized
in the EU countries by retailers such as Aldi and Lidl, have relatively small sizes and offer much fewer categories
of goods — less than 10% of the lines offered by large retailers. Their assortment is dominated by private labels
and their shopping environment gives priority to functionality and low distribution costs. As a result, they can
offer prices up to 60% lower than those of leading name brands, and 40% lower than large retailers’ private labels.
See Dobson (2002) and Cleeren et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion.
3 See for example the reports of the US Federal Trade Commission (2001, 2003), the proceedings of the FTC
conference held on May 24, 2007, available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/grocery/index.shtm, or the groceries market
enquiries of the UK Competition Commission (2000, 2008) recommending the adoption of codes of practices. In
France, these concerns motivated in 1996 two Acts, aimed at curbing the expansion of large retailers as well as
the exploitation of their market power.
4 See Dobson and Waterson (1999) for a detailed discussion.
5 For example, Chen (2003) argues that buyer power results in lower prices for both retailers and consumers.
While practitioners have often voiced concerns that buyer power might discourage suppliers’ investment and
innovation — see for example European Commission (1999) at p. 4 —, Inderst and Wey (2007) develop a model in
which buyer power may instead increase suppliers’ investment and enhance welfare.
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devoted to the analysis of seller power and its impact on retail competition.6 Yet, as argued
by Paul Dobson (2009), it is in regard to how large retailers can distort retail competition that
we might see the most profound market effects. This paper sheds a new light on the exercise
of seller power and shows that it can lead large retailers to adopt a loss leading strategy, which
consists of pricing below cost some of the competitive products (leader products) and charging
higher prices for the other goods. This practice is indeed widely adopted by large retailers:
in its groceries market investigation, the UK Competition Commission notes for example that
most large retailers in the UK engage in loss leading, mainly for staples such as milk and dairy,
alcohol, bread and bakery products that consumers purchase repeatedly and regularly — and
which constitute the core product lines of small retailers such as hard-discounters; it finds that
the sales of loss leader products represent up to 6% of a retailer’s total sales.7
Antitrust enforcement and regulations against loss leading have stirred hot debates. For
instance, in 2000 the German Federal Cartel Office ordered Wal-Mart, Aldi, and Lidl to stop
selling below cost staples including milk and butter, arguing that this could impair competition
and force smaller retailers to exit the market. By contrast, OECD (2007) argues that rules
against loss leading are likely to protect inefficient competitors and harm consumers. There
are also conflicting judgements on loss leading in US case law. For example, in American
Drugs vs. Wal-Mart Stores (1993), Wal-Mart was sued under Arkansas’ Unfair Practice Act
for below-cost pricing on certain pharmaceuticals. Wal-Mart lost the initial trial, but however
successfully appealed before the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which ruled that "the loss-leader
strategy employed by Conway Wal-Mart is readily justifiable as a tool to foster competition and
to gain a competitive edge as opposed to simply being viewed as a stratagem to eliminate rivals
6 The recent literature on seller power has mainly focused on its interaction with buyer power through the so-
called "waterbed effect". Dobson and Inderst (2007) and Inderst and Valletti (2008) argue for example that large
retailers, who possess more bargaining power than their smaller rivals, can obtain better terms when negotiating
with suppliers, which in turn may lead suppliers to increase the prices they charge to smaller retailers. While
such a waterbed effect could cause a self-perpetuating process widening the gap in the terms obtained by large
and small retailers, some of the latter ones, such as hard discounters, belong to large retail networks who have
developed their own private labels and business formats designed to reduce their operational costs. This paper
studies such asymmetric competition, where large retailers face smaller but more efficient retailers, and ignores
the role of buyer power in order to focus specifically on how large retailers can use their seller power at the expense
of consumers and smaller rivals.
7 See Competition Commission (2008); Dobson (2002) also provides a detailed economic analysis of loss-leading
pricing in UK grocery retailing, with particular emphasis on bakery retailers.
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all together."8 A similar discrepancy appears in the statutes dealing with below-cost sales.9
In the US, 22 states are equipped with general sales-below-cost laws, and 16 additional states
prohibit below-cost sales on motor fuel. In the EU, below-cost resale is banned in Belgium,
France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain, and is restricted in other countries including
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland, whereas it is generally
allowed in the Netherlands and the UK.
In the absence of specific regulations, practitioners tend to tackle loss leading with predatory-
pricing approaches.10 However, loss leading is a persistent below-cost pricing strategy, and in
most cases courts and competition authorities are unlikely to show the feasibility that the preda-
tor could recoup the losses incurred during the predation phase by raising the prices after driving
the rival out of the market.11 For instance, in its 1997 report, the UK Office of Fair Trading
argued that, in the analysis of alleged predation in retailing cases, a price-cost comparison is of
little use, since pricing below cost on individual items may be profitable without being preda-
tory. This begs several related questions: what is the rationale for loss leading if it is not
predatory? What is then the impact on rivals, consumers and society? Competition authorities
face a dilemma in answering these questions.12
In the economic literature, loss leading has been viewed as an advertising strategy adopted to
8 See Boudreaux (1996) for details. Yet in Star Fuel Marts v. Murphy Oil (2003), a preliminary injunction was
granted under Oklahoma’s Unfair Sales Act, prohibiting below-cost sales of gasoline by Sam’s East, a Wal-Mart
subsidiary selling groceries in a wholesale club format. The court ruled that pricing below cost was prima facie
evidence of intent to harm competitors, as well as of a tendency to dampen competition.
9 See Skidmore et al. (2005). Calvani (2001) also discusses below-cost sales statutes in the U.S.
10 See e.g., Bolton, Brodley and Riordan (2000) and Eckert and West (2003) for detailed discussions of how
predatory-pricing tests should be designed.
11 The feasibility of recoupment is often a necessary condition for a case of predation; in the U.S., for example,
this approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in the Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp, which involved allegations of predatory pricing by Brown & Williamson against a smaller rival in an effort
to discipline the pricing of generic cigarettes. The Court noted that predatory pricing was generally implausible
without recoupment conditions, and further stated that intent ought to play no role in assessing whether conduct
is predatory.
12 For instance, in its most recent report, the UK Competition Commission concludes: "We find that the pattern
of below-cost selling that we observed by large grocery retailers does not represent behavior that was predatory
in relation to other grocery retailers." (See Competition Commission (2008) at p. 98). However, it also argues
that below-cost pricing by large retailers might disproportionately squeeze smaller rivals’ profit margins and even
force them to exit (See p. 96-97).
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attract consumers facing imperfect information of prices;13 below-cost pricing may then compen-
sate consumers for their imperfect information and thereby improve consumer surplus.14 Loss
leading has also been interpreted as an optimal cross-subsidizing strategy by a multi-product
firm facing different demand elasticities across products.15 By contrast, little attention has been
devoted to the often-voiced concerns that small retailers’ profits are squeezed by large retail-
ers’ loss-leading strategies, and that consumers may end-up facing higher prices for non-staple
products.16
This paper aims at filling this gap. We develop a model of asymmetric competition between
large and small retailers, reflecting the characteristics of concentrated local markets where a few
large retailers compete with smaller retailers who carry a narrower product range but in a more
efficient way, in terms of higher quality and/or lower cost. We moreover abstract away from the
above-mentioned efficiency justifications by assuming that consumers are perfectly informed of
all prices and by allowing for homogeneous consumer valuations for the goods. Our key modelling
feature is to account for the heterogeneity in consumers’ shopping costs: some consumers face
higher shopping costs, e.g., because of tighter time constraints or lower taste for shopping, and
thus have a stronger preference for one-stop shopping, whereas others have lower shopping costs
and can therefore benefit from multi-stop shopping.
We first present the main insights in a stylized setting where a large retailer enjoys a monopoly
position over some product lines (the monopolized segment) and faces a competitive fringe of
smaller but more efficient rivals on other goods (the competitive segment). For simplicity, in this
13 Lal and Matutes (1994), for example, consider a situation where multi-product firms compete for consumers
who are initially unaware of prices, and find that in equilibrium firms may indeed choose to advertise a few loss
leaders in order to increase store traffic. Ellison (2005) develops the model to analyze add-on pricing, and shows
that loss leading can be optimal when firms advertise base goods while add-on prices are unobserved.
14 Walsh and Whelan (1999) show that, in the presence of imperfect information, loss leading can generate the
same long-run equilibrium outcomes as those observed under a laissez-faire full information scenario.
15 Bliss (1988) may be the first paper viewing loss leading as a cross-subsidizing strategy, but does not formally
establish existence conditions. Beard and Stern (2008) build on this model and incorporate continuous rather
than unit consumer demands; they show that loss leading can indeed arise although for rather specific demand
functions. Ambrus and Weinstein (2008) study Bertrand competition among symmetric firms competing for one-
stop shoppers. They first show that loss leading cannot occur when consumers have inelastic demand. When
demand is elastic, loss leading can occur but only under rather specific forms of demand complementarity; in
particular, loss leading cannot arise when consumer demand is sufficiently diverse. The scope for loss leading in
these settings, as well as its impact on consumers and welfare, still needs to be assessed.
16 See, for intance, Dobson (2002), at p.13.
4
setting all consumers have homogeneous valuations for the goods. If the rivals were excluded
from the competitive segment, the large retailer would charge monopoly prices for both segments,
based on consumer valuations and the distribution of their shopping costs. When more efficient
rivals are present in the competitive segment, however, consumers with low shopping costs
engage in multi-stop shopping: they buy the competitive goods from a more efficient rival, who
offers better value, while still purchasing the monopolized goods from the large retailer. In
contrast, consumers with higher shopping costs, who thus favor one-stop shopping, keep buying
both types of products from the large retailer as long as its broader range of products delivers
overall a greater value. The presence of more efficient rivals thus exerts a competitive pressure
on the large retailer, but at the same time it opens a door for screening multi-stop shoppers
from one-stop shoppers. We show that this is optimally achieved by adopting a loss-leading
strategy, that is, by pricing the competitive goods below cost and raising instead the price for
the monopolized goods, keeping constant the total margin charged to one-stop shoppers; this
pricing strategy, which entails a negative margin in the competitive segment, allows the large
retailer to earn a higher margin from multi-stop shoppers in the monopolized segment.
We show that loss leading indeed arises whenever the additional value generated by the
large retailer’s broader lines of products (the monopolized segment) exceeds the rivals’ efficiency
advantage in the competitive segment. In any such cases, loss leading allows the large retailer
to increase its profit, at the expense of consumer surplus, market efficiency and social welfare.
When its broader range generates a large enough comparative advantage, the large retailer can
even obtain in this way more profit than in the absence of the smaller rivals. We then extend
the analysis to the case where the large retailer faces a strategic rival rather than a fringe in the
competitive segment, in which case loss leading also hurts the rival by reducing the market share
and squeezing the profit margin that the small retailer would otherwise obtain. However, this
margin squeeze appears here as a by-product of exploitation rather than driven by exclusionary
motives; indeed, it is the very presence of a rival offering better terms on a narrower range of
products that allows the large retailer to better screen consumers according to their shopping
costs. In other words, loss leading emerges here as an exploitative practice, adopted by the large
retailer to extract consumer surplus, rather than as an exclusionary device aimed at foreclosing
the market. Yet, the lack of exclusionary intention, as well as the fact that the small retailers
remain active, should not lead to the conclusion that loss leading is an innocuous strategy, since
its use as an exploitative device hurts consumers as well as rivals.17 We show that a ban on loss
17 In his report prepared on behalf of the Federation of Bakers, Dobson (2002) argues that the structure of
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leading would discipline the large retailer and benefit consumers as well as the small rival, and
would also increase social welfare by improving the distribution efficiency in the competitive
segment.
Finally, we show that loss leading still arises in more general settings with heterogeneous
consumer valuations for the goods and/or (imperfect) competition among large retailers (in a
symmetric Hotelling fashion). While retail competition among large retailers limits their overall
margins, the presence of smaller but more efficient rivals still opens a door for discriminating
multi-stop shoppers from one-stop shoppers, and again this is optimally achieved through loss
leading. The exploitative use of loss leading thus appears to be a robust feature in market
environments where a few large retailers enjoy substantial market power over one-stop shoppers
and compete with more efficient rivals carrying narrower lines of products.
To summarize, this paper provides a new rationale for the adoption of loss leading and
highlights its harmful impact on retail competition and consumers in the absence of efficiency
justifications, thus giving support to small rivals’ complaints and competition concerns.18 The
analysis also supports the expressed doubts about the exclusionary motive of the practice, and
stresses instead its role as an exploitative device. Yet, this exploitative use of loss leading harms
consumers and society as well as the small rivals, which may provide a rationale for antitrust
enforcement.19
While this research is motivated by the use of loss leading in retail markets, its insights apply
to a variety of situations where: (i) a firm enjoys substantial market power in one market and
faces tougher competition in other markets; (ii) dealing with a single supplier gives customers
some benefits (e.g. due to scale economies, lower adoption or maintenance costs, ...), which vary
the UK retail market, and the mix of different retail formats, is particularly conducive to the emergence of loss
leading, as a form of competitive price discrimination which could lead to higher prices on other products, thus
harming consumers as well as squeezing smaller rivals’ profits.
18 Chambolle (2005) also studies asymmetric competition between a large retailer and a smaller one, in a different
setting in which both retailers are equally efficient, but a majority of consumers is closer to the smaller store, and
travel costs are too large for multi-stop shopping; the large retailer then never uses the competitive good as a loss
leader, but can instead use in this way the monopolized good, in which case this can benefit consumers as well
as society. This is in line with the observation that in practice, concerns are voiced when loss leaders are chosen
among the staples offered by the smaller retailers.
19 Allain and Chambolle (2005) and Rey and Vergé (2010) note however that below-cost pricing regulations
can allow manufacturers to impose price floors on their retailers, in which case they can be used to better exert
market power or to reduce interbrand as well as intrabrand competition; banning loss leaders may then have a
perverse effect on consumer welfare.
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across customers. Pricing below cost in the competitive markets then allows the larger firm to
screen customers more effectively and extract part of the benefits. This insight can shed a new
light on antitrust cases such as the IBM and Microsoft cases;20 while the debates have mainly
focused on exclusionary purposes, our analysis suggests an alternative framework of analysis
based instead on exploitative motives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of asymmetric
retail competition between a large retailer and smaller rivals, where consumers only differ in their
shopping costs. Section 3 shows that loss leading arises as an exploitative device whenever the
large retailer enjoys substantial market power over some product segments and competes in
other segments with a fringe of smaller but more efficient retailers; section 4 extends this insight
to the case where the large retailer competes instead with a strategic smaller retailer. Section 5
analyzes the welfare impact of a ban on loss leading, while section 6 investigates the robustness
of the analysis under more general settings that allow imperfect competition and heterogeneous
consumer valuations, and discusses applications to a variety of situations. Finally, section 7
concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Market structure and consumer choice
A large retailer (denoted by L), who supplies a broad range of products, competes in a local
market with one or several homogeneous small retailers (denoted by S) who offer much narrower
product lines. For the sake of exposition, we simply assume that there are two markets (which
can be interpreted as different goods or different lines of products), A and B. Product A is
monopolized by L, while different varieties of product B, denoted by BL and BS , are offered
by L and S; in what follows, we will refer to A as the "monopolized segment" and to B as the
"competitive segment". L incurs respectively a unit cost cA and cL for supplying A and BL,
while S faces a unit cost cS for BS .
Each consumer desires at most one unit of A and one unit of B;21 consuming A or Bi (for
20 See e.g. United States v. International Business Machines Corporation, Docket number 69 Civ. DNE (S.D.
NY) and United States of America v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No. 98-1232 TPJ (D.C.).
21 The assumption of unit demands appears reasonable for groceries and other day-to-day consumer purchases.
To be sure, price changes affect the composition of consumer baskets, but are less likely to have a large impact
on the volume of purchases for staples.
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i = L,S) brings a utility uA or ui, while consuming both A and Bi yields uAi ≤ uA + ui.
22
Assuming homogeneous valuations for A, BL and BS allows us to avoid cross-subsidization
motives stemming from differences in demand elasticities, as studied by Bliss (1988).23 For the
analysis, it is convenient to use the social values wi ≡ ui − ci (for i = A,L,S) and wAi ≡
uAi − cA − ci (for i = L, S). We are interested in the case where it is socially efficient for L
to supply both products rather than one: wAL > wA, wL;
24 in particular, its broader range of
products enables L to bring an additional value wAL − wL > 0. We are moreover interested in
the case where small retailers are more efficient in distributing B:25 wS > wL. For the sake of
exposition, we assume that the efficiency advantage of small retailers does not affect the added
value of A: wAS −wS = wAL −wL.
Finally, we build on Armstrong and Vickers (2010) and assume that consumers incur a
shopping cost for visiting a store.26 This shopping cost may reflect the opportunity cost of the
time spent in traffic, parking, selecting products, checking out, and so forth; it may also account
for the consumer’s taste for shopping. To highlight the fact that consumers may be more or
less time-constrained, or value their shopping experience in different ways, we assume that the
shopping cost, denoted by t, varies across consumers and is distributed according to a cumulative
distribution function F (·), with density function f (·); we assume that the inverse hazard rate,
h (·) ≡ F (·) /f (·), is strictly increasing.27
We model retail competition as follows: (i) L and S simultaneously set their prices, re-
spectively (pA, pL) and pS ;
28 (ii) consumers then observe all prices and make their shopping
decisions. When making these decisions, consumers are thus fully aware of all prices and take
22 This allows for (partial) substitution between A and B; the analysis however readily applies to the case of
complementary goods — see section 7.2.
23 To show the robustness of the analysis, we relax this assumption in section 6.
24 These conditions imply cA < uAL − uL ≤ uA and cL < uAL − uA ≤ uL. It is thus indeed a fortiori efficient
for L to supply either product rather than none: wA, wL > 0.
25 For instance, small retailers could be discount stores with lower distribution costs, or specialist stores that
bring higher value for B.
26 Armstrong and Vickers (2010) consider a symmetric duopoly à la Hotelling in which consumers have het-
erogeneous and elastic demands for two products and incur an additional shopping cost when dealing with both
suppliers; they show the existence of an equilibrium in which firms price all products above (or at) cost but offer
conditional discounts (mixed bundling).
27 This assumption ensures that profit functions are single-peaked.
28 We first consider stand-alone prices, and show later that allowing for bundled discounts cannot increase L’s
profit; see the remark in section 3.
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also into account the value of the proposed assortments as well as their shopping costs.
We will successively consider several scenarios. In a first scenario, BS is competitively
supplied by a fringe of small retailers, who offer it at cost; this scenario allows us to develop
our main insight in the simplest way, by focusing on L’s strategy. In a second scenario, a single
small retailer acts instead as a strategic player. Studying the (pure strategy) equilibria of this
scenario allows us to show the robustness of the main insight and to discuss margin squeeze issues.
Finally, we extend the analysis to (imperfectly) competitive large retailers (and heterogeneous
valuations for the goods). Before considering these scenarios, we conclude this section with a
benchmark case in which L faces no competition from any rival.
2.2 Benchmark: monopoly
We suppose here that L is a monopolist for both products. By assumption, it is more profitable
to sell both products rather than one.29 Purchasing both products yields a net surplus uAL −
pA−pL−t. Consumers will therefore buy as long as t ≤ vAL ≡ uAL−pA−pL = wAL−rAL, where
vAL denotes the consumer value from purchasing both A and BL, while rAL ≡ pA− cA+pL−cL
denotes L’s total margin. The monopolist thus faces a demand F (vAL) and makes a profit
rALF (vAL) = rALF (wAL − rAL) .
This profit function is quasi-concave in rAL (see Appendix A), and the first-order condition is
given by:
rAL = h(vAL). (1)
The monopoly outcome is thus characterized by rmAL = wAL − v
m
AL and
vmAL ≡ l
−1 (wAL) , (2)
where the function l(x) ≡ x+ h(x) is increasing in x. L’s monopoly profit is then given by:30
ΠmAL ≡ F (v
m
AL)h(v
m
AL). (3)
29 Since consumers have homogeneous valuations, all active consumers behave in the same way. Suppose that
they buy B only (that is, pA ≥ uAL−uL); then reducing pA slightly below uAL−uL would ensure that consumers
buy A as well, bringing an additional profit (almost) equal to wAL − wL from each of them; a similar reasoning
applies to the case where active consumers would only buy A.
30 We implicitly assume away here any relevant upper bound on shopping costs. If t is instead distributed over
a range [0, T ], where T ≤ l−1 (wAL), then the optimal (monopoly) value is v
m
′
AL = T and the corresponding profit
is (wAL − T )F (T ).
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3 Loss leading as an exploitative device
We suppose in this section that a competitive fringe of small retailers supplies BS at cost: pS =
cS . One-stop shoppers can thus obtain wS by patronizing a small retailer, or vAL = wAL − rAL
by buying both products from L.
If one-stop shoppers favor L (vAL ≥ wS), which we will refer to as "regime L", small retailers
can only attract multi-stop shoppers, who buy A from L and BS from them. Multi-stop shopping
involves double shopping costs, 2t, but yields a value vAS ≡ uAS − pA − pS , and consumers are
willing to do so if vAS − 2t ≥ vAL − t, that is, if the additional shopping cost is offset by the
extra gain from multi-stop shopping (denoted by τ), i.e.,
t ≤ τ ≡ vAS − vAL = wS −wL + rL,
where rL ≡ pL − cL denotes L’s margin on BL.
Thus, in regime L consumers are willing to visit L as long as t ≤ vAL, while they prefer
patronizing both stores if t ≤ τ . L therefore attracts a demand F (vAL)−F (τ) for both products
(from one-stop shoppers) and an additional demand F (τ) for product A only (from multi-stop
shoppers);31 it thus obtains a profit equal to:
rAL (F (vAL)− F (τ)) + rAF (τ) = rALF (vAL)− rLF (τ) ,
where rA ≡ pA − cA = rAL − rL denotes L’s margin on A. Using vAL = wAL − rAL and
τ = wS −wL + rL, L’s profit can be further expressed as a function of rAL and rL as:
ΠL (rAL, rL) = rALF (wAL − rAL)− rLF (wS −wL + rL) , (4)
where ΠL (rAL, rL) is additively separable and moreover quasi-concave in rAL and rL (see Ap-
pendix A). To attract one-stop shoppers, L must however offer a better value than its rival:32
vAL ≥ wS , or
rAL ≤ wAL −wS . (5)
We now solve for the optimal margins rAL and rL, which maximize (4) subject to the
constraint (5). From the expression (4), it is clearly optimal for L to price BL below cost:
31 In Appendix B, it is shown that any pricing strategy leading to τ < 0 (resp., τ > vAL) is equivalent to a
pricing strategy yielding τ = 0 (resp., τ = vAL); therefore, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to
prices such that τ ∈ [0, vAL].
32 This condition also ensures that prospective multi-stop shoppers are indeed willing to buy A on a stand-alone
basis: wS ≤ vAL = wAL − rA − rL implies rA ≤ wAL − wS − rL = wAL − wL − τ < wAL − wL = wAS − wS .
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the second term −rLF (wS −wL + rL) is positive if and only if rL < 0.
33 The intuition is
straightforward. Keeping rAL — and thus the total price for one-stop shoppers — constant,
subsidizing BL allows L to increase its margin on A (rA > rAL) and reap in this way a higher
profit from multi-stop shoppers, who buy only A from it. Since the margin rL does not affect
(5), its optimum is then characterized by the first-order condition:
r∗L = −h(wS −wL + r
∗
L) = −h(τ
∗) < 0. (6)
Using r∗L = τ
∗ − (wS −wL), the optimal threshold τ
∗ is given by:
τ∗ ≡ l−1(wS −wL) > 0. (7)
Therefore, in regime L the large retailer obtains a profit equal to:
ΠL = rALF (vAL) + h (τ
∗)F (τ∗) ,
where the first term represents the base profit achieved from both types of customers, whereas
the second term represents the additional profit that is extracted from multi-stop shoppers
through loss leading.
In the absence of any restriction on its total margin, L would charge rAL = r
m
AL and offer
one-stop shoppers a value vAL = v
m
AL = l
−1 (wAL). Conversely, this strategy satisfies (5) and
thus attracts one-stop shoppers as long as vmAL ≥ wS, or wAL ≥ l (wS) (> wS); therefore, when L
derives a sufficiently large comparative advantage from its broader line of products, the optimal
strategy consists of charging the monopoly margin rmAL for the bundle, and r
∗
L = −h (τ
∗) for
BL.
34 The loss-leading strategy then gives L a profit equal to:
Π∗L = r
m
ALF (v
m
AL)− r
∗
LF (τ
∗) = ΠmAL + h (τ
∗)F (τ∗) ,
which exceeds the monopolistic profit ΠmAL.
When instead L’s comparative advantage is not large enough (namely, wAL < l (wS)), L
must improve its offer in order to keep attracting one-stop shoppers. It is then optimal for L
33 More precisely, any rL > 0 is dominated by rL = 0, which in turn is dominated by any slightly negative rL;
pricing way below cost (namely, rL < − (wS − wL)) would however eliminate multi-stop shopping (τ < 0) and
thus yield the same profit as rL = 0.
34 Note that τ∗ then satisfies τ∗ < vmAL. To see this, take instead vAL and τ as control variables and rewrite
L’s profit as ΠL(vAL, τ) = rALF (vAL) − rLF (τ) = (wAL − vAL)F (vAL) + (wS − wL − τ)F (τ ). Then we have
vmAL = argmaxv (wAL − v)F (v) > argmaxv (wS − wL − v)F (v) = τ
∗, since wAL ≥ l (wS) (> wS ≥ wS −wL).
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to match the value offered by the competitive fringe: v˜∗AL = wS, or r˜
∗
AL = wAL −wS (< r
m
AL).
35
The loss-leading strategy then gives L a profit equal to:
Π˜∗L ≡ (wAL −wS)F (wS) + h (τ
∗)F (τ∗) .
Alternatively, L can leave one-stop shoppers to the small retailers ("regime S") and focus
instead on multi-stop shoppers, who are willing to buy A from L as long as the added value
vA ≡ wAL −wL − rA exceeds the extra shopping cost t. In this way, L obtains:
ΠL = rAF (vA) = rAF (wAL −wL − rA).
It is then optimal for L to adopt the monopoly margin rmA which, together with the corresponding
value vmA = wAL −wL − r
m
A , are characterized by:
rmA = h(v
m
A ), v
m
A = l
−1 (wAL −wL) .
L’s profit in regime S is then given by:
ΠmA ≡ r
m
AF (v
m
A ).
The loss-leading strategy is clearly preferable when vmAL ≥ wS, since it then gives L more
profit than the monopolistic level ΠmAL (and the latter is greater than Π
m
A ).
36 We show in
Appendix B that it remains preferable as long as L enjoys a comparative advantage over S (that
is, wAL ≥ wS), which leads to:
Proposition 1 Suppose the large retailer (L) faces a competitive fringe of small retailers (S).
Then:
• When L enjoys a comparative advantage over S (i.e., wAL > wS), its unique optimal
pricing strategy involves loss leading: L prices the competitive product BL below cost.
Furthermore, when its comparative advantage is large (namely, vmAL ≥ wS), L keeps the
total margin for the two products at the monopoly level (rAL = r
m
AL) and earns a higher
profit than in the absence of any rivals; otherwise L simply obtains a total margin reflecting
its comparative advantage (rAL = wAL −wS).
35 If needed, L can slightly enhance its offer to make sure that it attacts all one-stop shoppers.
36 For the sake of exposition, throughout the paper we refer to loss leading as selling a product below cost. Here,
for instance, L may keep offering B below cost when wAL < wS , but it then only sells A (to multi-stop shoppers,
who buys B from S).
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• When instead L faces a comparative disadvantage (i.e., wAL < wS), its unique optimal
pricing strategy consists of monopolizing the non-competitive product and leaving the mar-
ket of the competitive product to the small retailers.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Whenever L can attract one-stop shoppers as well as multi-stop shoppers, loss leading pro-
vides an exploitative device, which allows L to discriminate more effectively these two categories
of consumers: keeping the total margin constant to attract one-stop shoppers, using BL as a
loss leader allows L to raise the price for A and earn higher profit from multi-stop shoppers.
As long as wS ≤ v
m
AL, L can keep the total price at the monopoly level and earns in this way
more profit than in the absence of any rival. In this range, an increase in wS actually benefits
L, who can exploit the efficiency gain of its rivals (h (τ∗)F (τ∗) increases with wS); however,
it also mitigates L’s comparative advantage and reduces the parameter region in which L can
benefit from loss leading. When instead vmAL < wS ≤ wAL, an increase in wS forces L to reduce
its total margin (rAL = wAL −wS decreases). Finally, when wS > wAL, L loses its comparative
advantage and can only monopolize market A.
Remark: Bundled discounts. In principle, L might offer three prices: one for A, one for BL
and one for the bundle. But, since L sells A to every consumer who visits its store, only two
prices matter here: the price pA when buying A only, and the total price pAL when buying both
A and BL. Alternatively, these prices can be implemented through stand-alone prices, pA for A
and pL ≡ pAL − pA for BL. Therefore, offering an additional bundled discount based on two
stand-alone prices pA and pL could not improve L’s profit here.
Illustration: Uniform density of shopping costs. Suppose that the shopping cost is uniformly
distributed: F (t) = t. The optimal rL and optimal threshold τ are then given by:
r∗L = −τ
∗, τ∗ =
wS −wL
2
.
Then, whenever wAL ≥ 2wS, the optimal margin rAL is set to the monopoly level
rmAL = v
m
AL =
wAL
2
,
and in this way L obtains more profit than the monopoly level:
Π∗L = Π
m
AL +
(wS −wL)
2
4
=
(wAL)
2
4
+
(wS −wL)
2
4
.
When instead wS ≤ wAL < 2wS , L maintains the same margin r
∗
L but charges r˜
∗
AL = wAL−wS ,
and its profit reduces to:
Π˜∗L = (wAL −wS)wS +
(wS −wL)
2
4
,
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which coincides with
ΠmA =
(wAL −wL)
2
4
when wAL = wS . Finally, whenever wAL < wS , L leaves the competitive segment to its smaller
rivals and earns ΠmA by exploiting its monopoly power on A.
Remark: asymmetric shopping costs. In practice, a consumer may incur different costs when
visiting L or S — visiting a larger store may for example be more time-consuming. Our analysis
easily extends to such situations. Suppose for example that consumers bear a cost αt when
patronizing L (and t, as before, when visiting S). The threshold τ remains unchanged,37 while
one-stop shoppers are now willing to patronize L as long as t < vAL/α. As long as L attracts
one-stop shoppers, its profit is now:
ΠL = rAL
(
F
(vAL
α
)
− F (τ)
)
+ rAF (τ) = rALF
(vAL
α
)
− rLF (τ) ,
which leads L to adopt the same loss-leading strategy as before r∗L = −h (τ
∗), where τ∗ =
l−1 (wAS −wAL).
4 Loss leading and margin squeeze
Focusing on the case where the small retailer is a competitive fringe allows us to highlight the
pure exploitative effect of loss leading without considering its impact on the smaller rivals, since
competition among them dissipate their margins anyway. Yet, in many antitrust cases, small
retailers have complained that their profits were squeezed as a result of large retailers’ loss-
leading strategies. We thus consider here the case where L competes against a single smaller
rival S; this allows us to analyze the margin-squeeze effect on S caused by loss leading.
S now earns a positive margin rS > 0 from the product BS and leaves a value vS = wS − rS
for the consumers. The previous analysis of L’s pricing behavior still applies here, except for
replacing the competitive value wS with the net value vS = wS − rS . We will focus here on the
regime where L attracts one-stop shoppers by offering a better value than its rival (vAL > vS). L
then faces a demand F (vAL)−F (τˆ) on both products from one-stop shoppers, and an additional
demand F (τˆ) on product A from multi-stop shoppers, where the shopping cost threshold is given
by:
τˆ ≡ vAS − vAL = wS −wL + rL − rS . (8)
37 A consumer favors multi-stop shopping if vAS − (1 + α) t > vAL − αt, which amounts as before to t < τ =
vAS − vAL.
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In this way, L earns a profit:
ΠL = rALF (vAL)− rLF (τˆ)
= rALF (wAL − rAL)− rLF (wS −wL + rL − rS) . (9)
The optimal margins are then determined implicitly by the first-order conditions
rAL = h(vAL) and rL = −h(τˆ).
Since S only attracts multi-stop shoppers, it obtains a profit
ΠS = rSF (τˆ) = rSF (wS −wL + rL − rS) . (10)
Therefore, its best response to rL is given by the first-order condition:
rS = h(τˆ).
These first-order conditions form a candidate equilibrium in which L: (i) earns the monopoly
margin for the bundle of products (rˆ∗AL = r
m
AL), and (ii) prices the competitive good below cost
(rˆ∗L = −rˆ
∗
S = −h(τˆ
∗)). The equilibrium margin rˆ∗L and rˆ
∗
S and the resulting threshold τˆ
∗ thus
satisfy:
τˆ∗ = wS −wL + rˆ
∗
L − rˆ
∗
S = wS −wL − 2h(τˆ
∗),
which yields
τˆ∗ ≡ j−1(wS −wL), (11)
where j(x) ≡ x+ 2h(x) is strictly increasing. In this candidate equilibrium, S earns a profit
Πˆ∗S ≡ h (τˆ
∗)F (τˆ∗) ,
while L obtains
Πˆ∗L ≡ Π
m
AL + h (τˆ
∗)F (τˆ∗) .
Since τˆ∗ = j−1(wS − wL) < l
−1(wS − wL) = τ
∗, L’s profit is lower than in the previous case,
where it was facing a competitive fringe of small retailers.
For the above margins to form an equilibrium, two conditions must be satisfied: first, L must
indeed attract one-stop shoppers; second, while L has no incentive to exclude its rival, since it
earns more profit than a pure monopolist, S may want to attract one-stop shoppers by offering
a higher value than vmAL. We show in Appendix C that these two conditions are satisfied when
L enjoys a significant comparative advantage, namely, when wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS , wL), where the
threshold wˆAL (wS , wL) lies above wS and increases with wS . We also show that loss leading
does not arise when wAL < wˆAL (wS, wL):
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Proposition 2 Suppose that the large retailer, L, faces a strategic smaller rival, S. Then loss
leading arises in a unique Nash equilibrium if and only if L enjoys a significant comparative
advantage (namely, wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS , wL)). In that equilibrium, L sells the competitive product
below-cost while keeping the total price for both products at the monopoly level, and it earns a
profit higher than that absent the rival.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Loss leading thus constitutes a robust exploitative device, which allows L to discriminate
multi-stop shoppers from one-stop shoppers even when competing with a strategic smaller rival.
As before, adopting loss leading allows L to earn even more profit than a pure monopolist if
its comparative advantage is large enough. Compared with the case of a competitive fringe,
loss leading is now adopted in equilibrium only when it allows L to earn the full monopoly
margin from one-stop shoppers, but it does so in a broader range of circumstances: it is shown
in Appendix C that the equilibrium condition wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS , wL) is less stringent than the
similar condition for the case of a competitive fringe (vmAL ≥ wS).
Compared with the case of a competitive fringe of smaller retailers, whose profit is not
affected by L’s behavior, the loss-leading strategy now reduces S’s profit, not only by decreasing
its market share, but also by squeezing its margin: S’s best response is rS = h (τˆ), where τˆ =
l−1 (wS −wL + rL) decreases with rL. Yet, this appears here as a side effect of the exploitative
motive rather than as the result of exclusionary motive. In particular, foreclosing the market
through strategic tying or (pure) bundling would not be profitable here, since L could obtain at
most the monopoly profit in the case of exclusion.
Remark: Strategic margin squeeze. Although margin squeeze appears here as a by-product of
the use of loss leading as an exploitative device, the large retailer has an incentive to manipulate
its rivals’ prices: the lower S’s price for BS , the more L can extract from multi-stop shoppers. As
a result, and in contrast to the standard case where firms usually benefit from higher rival prices,
here L wants S to decrease its own price. Thus, if L could move first and act as a Stackelberg
leader, it would decrease even further its price for BL (in contrast with the standard Stackelberg
insight), so as to force S to respond by decreasing its own price, and in this way allow L to raise
its price on A for multi-stop shoppers.
Since L benefits from the presence of S, it may however want to limit its loss-leading strategy
in order to maintain that presence. Suppose for example that the entry of S is uncertain. It is then
profitable for L to adopt a loss-leading strategy in case of entry, in order to extract additional
rents from multi-stop shoppers, but this also reduces the likelihood of entry. Thus, while L could
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not gain from committing itself to never adopting a loss-leading strategy (since then it would
extract no additional rent from multi-stop shoppers), it would benefit from limiting its extent.
We develop a simple model along this line in Appendix D, which yields the following insights:
Proposition 3 If L and S compete as Stackelberg leader and follower, then whenever L’s com-
parative advantage leads it to adopt a loss-leading strategy, it sells the competitive product B
further below-cost, compared with what it would do in the absence of a first-mover advantage.
However, if the entry of S depends on the realization of a random entry cost, then when L’s
comparative advantage leads it to adopt a loss-leading strategy, it limits the subsidy on B so as
to increase the likelihood of entry.
Proof. See Appendix D.
5 Banning loss leading
We now show that loss leading reduces consumer surplus and social welfare as well as smaller
rivals. For the sake of exposition, we consider here the scenario where L faces a strategic rival,
and focus moreover on the regime in which L attracts one-stop shoppers and thus engages in
loss leading (that is, wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS, wL)).
Suppose L is not allowed to price below cost. We show in Appendix E that L then keeps
attracting one-stop shoppers in equilibrium. Since the profit expression (9) is quasi-concave and
separable in rAL and rL, L maintains the total margin at the monopoly level (r
m
AL) but now sells
BL at cost (rL = 0); consequently, its profit is reduced to Π
m
AL = r
m
ALF (v
m
AL).
Since L no longer subsidizes the competitive segment, S faces more demand from multi-stop
shoppers: the shopping cost threshold increases from τ = wS−wL+r
∗
L−rS to τ = wS−wL−rS .
Maximizing its profit ΠS = rSF (τ) then leads S to charge a margin satisfying rS = h (τ) =
h (wS −wL − rS), and the equilibrium threshold becomes:
τ∗ = l−1(wS −wL) > j
−1(wS −wL) = τˆ
∗.
That is, S increases its market share (from τˆ∗ to τ∗) and its margin (from rˆ∗S = h (τˆ
∗) to
rˆbS ≡ h (τ
∗)) and, consequently, increases its profit by
∆ΠS = h (τ
∗)F (τ∗)− h (τˆ ∗)F (τˆ∗) > 0.
Banning loss leading does not affect the value of one-stop shopping, since L maintains the
same total margin, rmAL. It however encourages consumers to take advantage of multi-stop shop-
ping: banning loss leading forces L to compete "on the merits", which induces those consumers
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with a shopping cost lower than τ∗ to patronize both stores; in contrast, subsidizing BL (and
overcharging A by the same amount) discourages consumers with a shopping cost exceeding τˆ∗
from visiting S. The ban on loss leading thus benefits consumers whose shopping cost lies be-
tween τˆ∗ and τ∗, since the resulting lower price for A allows them to save τ∗−t. Using a revealed
preference argument, it also benefits genuine multi-stop shoppers (those with a shopping cost
t < τˆ∗), by increasing the value of multi-stop shopping from vˆ∗AS ≡ v
m
AL+ τˆ
∗ to v∗AS ≡ v
m
AL+ τ
∗.
Overall, a ban on loss leading thus increases total consumer surplus by:
∆CS = (τ
∗ − τˆ∗)F (τˆ∗) +
∫ τ∗
τˆ∗
(τ∗ − t)dF (t) > 0.
Finally, the increase in multi-stop shopping activity also enhances efficiency, since more
consumers benefit from a better distribution of B. The gain in social welfare is equal to:
∆W =
∫ τ∗
τˆ∗
(wS −wL − t)dF (t),
and is positive since τˆ∗ < τ∗ < wS −wL. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 4 Assume that L faces a strategic rival and would would engage in loss leading.
Banning below-cost pricing then leads to an equilibrium where L maintains the same total margin
but sells the competitive good at cost; as a result, the ban increases consumer surplus, the rival’s
profit, and social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix E.
A similar analysis applies when L faces a competitive fringe. While loss leading no longer
affects rivals’ profit, it still reduces their market share and thus distorts distribution efficiency
at the expense of consumers. Banning loss leading thus improves again consumer surplus and
social welfare.
As noted in the introduction, competition authorities have been reluctant to treat loss leading
as predatory pricing, and some countries have instead adopted below-cost pricing regulations. By
showing that loss leading can be used as an exploitative device, to extract extra rents from multi-
stop shoppers, rather than as an exclusionary or predatory practice, our analysis sheds a new
light on the rationale of loss leading and can help placing the assessment of its anticompetitive
effects on firmer ground.
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6 Extensions: heterogeneous valuations and competition among
large retailers
The use of loss leading as an exploitative device, which aims at extracting additional surplus
from multi-stop shoppers, has been so far established in a relatively simple setting where a large
retailer enjoys local monopoly power on some product segments and consumers have moreover
homogeneous valuations in all segments. We now investigate the robustness of our insights in
more general situations.
Note first that introducing heterogeneous valuations for B does not affect our analysis of
loss leading as long as consuming BL remains efficient (that is, uL > cL for all consumers):
since L prices BL below cost in equilibrium, the consumer value from BL is always positive
(vL = uL − pL > 0), and so is the value from BS as vS > vL; therefore, one-stop shoppers would
still buy BL from L and likewise multi-stop shoppers would buy BS from S. By contrast,
heterogeneous valuations for A make its demand elastic, which limits L’s ability to raise prices
in this segment; this may make loss leading less attractive, since the purpose of the exploitative
device is precisely to earn more from multi-stop shoppers on this segment. Likewise, (imperfect)
competition among large retailers curbs their capacity to charge high prices on A and may also
discourage the use of loss leading as an exploitative device.
To check the robustness further, we extend here the basic setting to allow for an elastic
demand for A and also for (imperfect) competition among large retailers.
6.1 Heterogeneous valuations
We assume here that consumers vary in their valuations of product A: specifically, a consumer
with preference x obtains a utility uA −
x
σ − pA = wA − rA −
x
σ . The situation is thus the same
as in our basic framework, except that L now faces an elastic demand for A; the parameter
σ reflects this elasticity: the higher σ, the faster consumers drop in case of a price increase.
The parameter x can be interpreted as the "distance" between the consumer’s ideal variety and
that proposed by L, and is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function G (·),
with density g (·), which allows for quite general demand functions; we only assume here that
the inverse hazard rate, k (·) ≡ G (·) /g (·), is strictly increasing. Finally, we allow as before for
general distributions of shopping costs (including bounded ones — see below).
One-stop shoppers are now willing to patronize L if:
t ≤ vAL −
x
σ
⇐⇒ x ≤ σ (vAL − t) ,
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where as before vAL = wAL − rAL. They also prefer this to patronizing S as long as:
vAL −
x
σ
≥ vS = wS − rS ⇐⇒ x ≤ xˆ ≡ σ (vAL − vS) .
The potential one-stop shoppers are thus the consumers for whom:
x ≤ xAL (t) ≡ σ (vAL −max {t, vS}) .
Likewise, consumers prefer multi-stop shopping to patronizing L only if
t ≤ τ = vS −wL + rL,
and prefer this to buying BS only if the additional value from consuming A offsets the extra
shopping cost:
t ≤ vA −
x
σ
⇐⇒ x ≤ xA (t) ≡ σ (vA − t) ,
where vA ≡ wA − rA. Therefore, as long as L attracts some one-stop shoppers (vAL > vS) and
S attracts some multi-stop shoppers (τ > 0), then (see Figure 1):
• consumers with t < τ buy A from L and BS from S if x < xA (t) (region DAS), and only
BS otherwise (region DS);
• consumers with τ < t < vAL and x < xAL (t) buy both A and BL from L (region DAL),
and otherwise buy either BS only (if t ≤ vS) or nothing (if t > vS).
The corresponding demands are portrayed in Figure 1.
x
t
( )ALx x t=
Svτ
ALD
$x
0
( )Ax x t=
ASD
ALv
SD
Figure 1: Heterogeneous valuations for A
This description applies as well when the shopping cost t is bounded, truncating if necessary
the relevant interval for t. For example, if the shopping cost is distributed over [0, T ], where
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T < vS , then all consumers are willing to buy BS from S; therefore, market B is always entirely
served, by either a small or a large retailer. In addition, some consumers (those with a higher
taste for A and/or lower shopping cost) will also buy A from L. More precisely, a consumer will
buy A from L when x ≤ xA (t) if t < τ , and when x ≤ xAL (t) (< xA (t)) if t ∈ [τ, T ] (in which
case it will also buy BL from L).
We show in Appendix F that, in all these cases, introducing an elastic demand does not
preclude the large retailer from adopting a loss-leading strategy, so as to extract additional
surplus from multi-stop shoppers:
Proposition 5 Suppose that consumers have heterogeneous valuations for A. Then, as long as
it attracts some one-stop shoppers in equilibrium, the large retailer adopts a loss-leading pricing
strategy to exploit extra surplus from multi-stop shoppers.
Proof. See Appendix F.
As before, keeping constant the total price for the assortment ABL offered to one-stop
shoppers, subsidizing BL allows L to increase the price it charges to multi-stop shoppers on
market A. By contrast with the previous case, however, increasing the price for A not only
discourages multi-stop shopping, but also results in fewer sales, since the demand for A is now
elastic. Yet, the analysis shows that multi-stop shoppers’ demand is relatively less price-sensitive
than the demand of one-stop shoppers, and as a result, subsidizing B to increase the price of A
remains a profitable strategy. More precisely:
• In the range t ∈ [0, τ ], the marginal consumer is a multi-stop shopper located at x =
xA (t) = σ (vA − t); an increase in the relevant margin rA thus generates a loss of demand
−σg (xA (t)) but increases the profit achieved on the mass G (xA (t)) of consumers that
actually buy. Thus, if the retailers could charge customized margins, tailored to the
shopping cost, they would adopt rA (t) = G (xA (t)) /σg (xA (t)) = k (xA (t)) /σ.
• Similarly, in the range t ∈ [τ, vAL], the marginal consumer is a one-stop shopper located
at x = xAL (t) = σvAL − σmax {t, vS}, and the optimal customized margin would thus be
rAL (t) = k (xAL (t)) /σ.
By construction, xA (.) and xAL (.) decrease as t increases and coincide at t = τ (see Figure
1);38 the monotonicity of the hazard rate thus implies that L wants to charge higher margins to
multi-stop shoppers (t < τ) than to one-stop shoppers (t > τ), which requires subsidizing BL.
38 That is, consumers who face a higher shopping cost are less likely to buy and/or to visit multiple stores.
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6.2 Competition among large retailers
Suppose now that two large retailers are present, L1 and L2, who incur the same costs in
distributing A and B, and offer the same variety BL but differentiated varieties A1 and A2: a
consumer with preference x then obtains a utility uA −
x
σ
− pA1 = wA − rA1 −
x
σ
from buying
A1 and a utility wA − rA2 −
1−x
σ from buying A2. We will restrict attention to symmetric
distributions (that is, the density g (·) satisfies g (x) = g (1− x)) and will focus on (symmetric)
equilibria in which: (i) the large retailers compete against each other as well as against their
smaller rivals; (ii) small retailers attract some multi-stop shoppers by offering a value vS that
exceeds the value vL offered by large retailers on the B market; and (iii) large retailers attract
some one-stop shoppers by offering them a value vAL that exceeds vS, as well as the value vA
that they offer on the A market alone.
Large retailers may compete against each other for one-stop and/or for multi-stop shoppers.
In the former case, in a symmetric equilibrium (of the form rA1L1 = rA2L2 = rAL and rL1 =
rL2 = rL) some consumers (with x = 1/2) are indifferent between buying both goods from either
L1 or L2, and prefer doing so to patronizing S only; this implies (using x = 1/2, and dropping
the subscripts 1 and 2 for ease of exposition):
vˆAL ≡ vAL −
1
2σ
≥ vS ,
which is equivalent to
vˆA ≡ vA −
1
2σ
≥ τ = vS − vL.
Therefore, consumers with preference x = 1/2 and shopping cost t < τ , who thus prefer multi-
stop shopping (that is, buying BS from S and A from either L1 or L2) to visiting L1 or L2 only,
also prefer multi-stop shopping to patronizing S only (since t < τ then implies t < vˆA). In other
words, if large retailers compete for one-stop shoppers, they will also compete for multi-stop
shoppers. This observation allows us to classify the (symmetric) candidate equilibria into two
types:
• Type M : large retailers compete only for multi-stop shoppers;
• Type O: large retailers compete for one-stop shoppers as well as for multi-stop shoppers.
In the first type of equilibria (which is illustrated in Figure 2), for x = 1/2 some consumers
with low shopping costs are indifferent between assortments A1S and A2S, and prefer those
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assortments to any other option, whereas consumers with higher shopping costs patronize S
only; the relevant threshold for the shopping cost satisfies
vˆA + vS − 2t = vS − t,
that is, t = vˆA. Consumers with t < vˆA thus buy B from S and A from either L1 or L2
(depending on whether x is smaller or larger than 1/2). Conversely, consumers whose shopping
costs exceed vAL do not shop. As for consumers whose shopping costs lie between vˆA and vAL:
• when t < τ , consumers still buy BS from S; they also buy A from L1 if x < xA (t) =
σ (vA − t), or from L2 if x > 1− xA (t);
• when t > τ :
— if x < xAL (t), consumers buy both goods from L1;
— if x > 1− xAL (t), consumers buy both goods from L2;
— if xAL (t) < x < 1 − xAL (t), consumers patronize S if t < vS , and buy nothing
otherwise.
1 ( )Ax x t= −
x
t
1
2
( )ALx x t=
Svτ
1 1A L
D
$x
1
τ
0
Sv
( )Ax x t=
1 ( )ALx x t= −2 2A L
D
1A S
D
2A S
D
ALv
ALv
SD
$1 x−
Av$
Figure 2: Large retailers competing for multi-stop shoppers
In the second type of equilibria (illustrated in Figure 3), all consumers with a shopping cost
t < τ buy BS from S and A from either L1 (if x < 1/2) or L2 (if x > 1/2), while consumers
with t > vAL buy nothing. For consumers with τ < t < vAL, then:
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• if t < vˆAL, consumers will buy both goods from either L1 (if x < 1/2) or L2 (if x > 1/2);
• if vˆAL < t < vAL, consumers will buy both goods from L1 if x < xAL (t) or from L2 if
x > 1− xAL (t), and buy nothing otherwise.
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Figure 3: Large retailers competing for both types of consumers
A similar description applies when the shopping cost t is bounded, truncating as necessary
the interval for t. We show in the Appendix G that loss leading is still used as an exploitative
device:
Proposition 6 Suppose that large retailers compete against each other as well as against their
smaller rivals. Then, large retailers adopt a loss-leading pricing strategy in any symmetric
equilibrium in which they attract some one-stop shoppers.
Proof. See Appendix G.
While competition here limits large retailers’ margins (on A as well as on the assortment AL),
loss leading still allows them to better discriminate consumers according to their shopping costs.
Pricing BL below cost, and increasing the price of A so as to maintain rAL unchanged, does not
affect one-stop shoppers, who are still willing to buy A, but allows large retailers to extract more
surplus from multi-stop shoppers who only buy product A from them. While this strategy may
also encourage some multi-stop shoppers to switch to the other large retailer as well as to stop
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buying A, the analysis shows that multi-stop shoppers remain less price-sensitive than one-stop
shoppers; as a result, large retailers aim again at charging greater margins on them, and the
loss-leading strategy remains profitable. The use of loss leading as an exploitative device thus
appears quite robust in market environments where large retailers compete imperfectly against
each other and face smaller rivals who are more efficient in distributing a narrower range of
products.
7 Applications
7.1 Competition versus acquisition
In practice, the retail chains operating large stores have often entered into smaller-scale retail
markets, either by setting-up their own discount or specialist stores or by merging with existing
chains of small stores. For instance, the French leading retailer, Carrefour, has created the dis-
count chain LeaderPrice, which provides a short range of staples with lower prices and competes
face to face with traditional discounters such as Lidl in some local markets, and more recently
has started to open smaller stores (under the names "Carrefour City" and "Carrefour Market").
We analyze here the impact of such entry on retail competition, by assuming that L can either
open (at no cost) a smaller but more efficient format similar to S, or acquire such a store. We
consider several initial situations.
In local markets where L faces a competitive fringe of small rivals, opening yet another store
would have no effect on firms’ profits and consumer surplus. By contrast, in markets where
L initially enjoys a monopoly position, opening a smaller store generates extra profit through
a better screening of consumers. As long as L enjoys a comparative advantage for one-stop
shoppers (i.e., wAL > wS), it is optimal to induce them to patronize L, and use S to cater to
multi-stop shoppers. The total profit is then given by:
ΠL +ΠS = rAL (F (vAL)− F (τ)) + (rS + rA)F (τ) ,
where the first term is the profit from one-stop shoppers, while the second term is that from
multi-stop shoppers. Using rA = rAL − rL, it can be rewritten as:
ΠL +ΠS = rALF (vAL) + (rS − rL)F (τ) .
It is thus optimal to charge rAL = r
m
AL and rL− rS = −h (τ
∗), where τ∗ = l−1(wS −wL), and in
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this way L and S generate a joint profit equal to Π∗L = Π
m
AL + h (τ
∗)F (τ∗).39 Since it does not
affect the value of one-stop shopping, but transforms some consumers into multi-stop shoppers,
opening the small store enhances consumer surplus and total welfare as well as it improves profit.
Whenever L faces a single small store in a local market, it will adopt a loss-leading strategy
if its comparative advantage is large enough (namely, if wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS , wL)), and obtains in
this way a profit Πˆ∗L = Π
m
AL + h (τˆ
∗)F (τˆ∗), which is lower than in the case of a competitive
fringe, as the strategic response of S reduces the extra profit that L can extract from multi-
stop shoppers. Opening a small store to compete head to head with S would then reduce the
margin rS down to zero, and thus restore L’s ability to extract h (τ
∗)F (τ∗) from multi-stop
shoppers. However, as the resulting competition may also constrain L’s pricing policy towards
one-stop shoppers (if wAL < l (wS), L must lower its total margin below r
m
AL so as to match the
value that one-stop shoppers would get from S), this is profitable only when L’s comparative
advantage is strong enough.40 As the competition fosters multi-stop shopping (the shopping cost
threshold increases from τˆ∗ to τ∗), and can only have a positive impact on one-stop shopping,
it also enhances consumer surplus as well as total welfare. Alternatively, L may instead acquire
S, in which case L and S could together generate again a total profit of Π∗L. This scenario is
equivalent to opening a new store if L’s comparative advantage is particularly large (namely,
wAL ≥ l (wS)), otherwise the merger is more profitable as it avoids the competitive constraint
on the price charged to one-stop shoppers. In both cases, however, consumers and society would
benefit from such a merger, which would again foster multi-stop shopping (if wAL < l (wS), then
consumers and society would however benefit even more from the opening of an additional store
competing with S).
The following proposition summarizes this discussion:
Proposition 7 In local markets in which there is initially imperfect competition in the B segment,
whenever it enjoys a large enough comparative advantage, the large retailer can then benefit from
either opening or acquiring a smaller but more efficient store, and this also enhances consumer
surplus and total welfare.
39 This profit corresponds to what L would obtain when facing a competitive fringe of small stores, provided it
benefits from a large enough comparative advantage (namely, if vmAL ≥ wS); otherwise competition would partly
dissipate this profit.
40 This is clearly the case when wAL ≥ l (wS), since then v
m
AL = l
−1 (wAL) ≥ wS and L thus obtains Π
∗
L =
ΠmAL + h (τ
∗)F (τ∗) when smaller rivals charge rS = 0; by continuity, this is still the case when wAL is not
excessively lower than l (wS).
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7.2 Complementary goods and adoption costs
While we have focused here on the case where A and B are independent goods or partial
substitutes, the analysis applies also — even more straightforwardly — to the case of complements.
Suppose for example that A is a prerequisite for using B (as in the case of CD players and
speakers): product B has no value on a stand-alone basis (uL = uS = 0), and must be used
together with product A (with wAS = uAS − cA − cS > wAL = uAL − cA − cL).
41 Denoting
by wS (resp. wL) the additive value for using BS (resp. BL) on top of product A, the above
analysis goes through, except that one-stop shoppers necessarily favor L (since there is no value
in patronizing S only). Regime L thus systematically prevails, and as a result, L always engages
in loss leading: it charges the monopoly margin rmAL for the bundle and a negative margin,
r∗L = −h (τ
∗), for BL.
Also, while we have focused so far on retail markets, the insights apply to industries in
which the costs of adopting a technology, of learning how to use a product, of maintaining
equipment, and so forth, play a role similar to the shopping costs that consumers incur to
visit an additional store. These insights can therefore shed a new light on famous antitrust
cases such as the Microsoft saga, in which Microsoft has been accused of excluding rivals in
adjacent markets — e.g., the markets for browsers or media players. While the arguments mainly
focused there on the rationality of an exclusionary conduct, our analysis suggests an alternative
motivation for subsidizing or otherwise encouraging customers to adopt the platform developer’s
own application, to the detriment of its rivals.
To see this, suppose that L runs a platform A and offers an application BL that competes
with a fringe of rivals’ applications BS, and consider first a simple example where: (i) A and
B are perfect complements (that is, uA = uL = uS = 0), and (ii) rivals offer a better product
(wAS > wAL), but (iii) adopting a rival application (which may involve a different environment,
or switching and learning costs in case of entry) involves a cost t that varies across customers
according to the distribution F (.). Our analysis then carries through. By construction, cus-
tomers purchase either AL or AS, and favor "mix-and-match" when t < τ = wAS −wAL + rL;
as long as L sells its application (i.e., rAL ≤ wAL), it obtains a profit equal to:
ΠL = rAF (τ) + rAL (1− F (τ)) = rAL − rLF (τ) .
L’s optimal pricing policy thus consists in charging the full price for the bundle (rAL = wAL)
41 The analysis applies irrespective of whether A generates or not a value on a stand-alone basis, as long as
combining it with B generates a higher value.
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and subsidizing its application: rL = −h (τ
∗), where as before τ∗ = l−1 (wAS −wAL).
While the cost of adopting L’s application was for simplicity assumed to be constant, the
insight carries over to situations where both adoption costs vary across customers, as long as
adopting a rival application involves a higher cost. For example, if adopting L’s or the rivals’
applications involve costs αt and (1 + a) t, respectively, then the mix-and-match threshold τ
remains unchanged, and the analysis parallels that of asymmetric shopping costs (see the remark
at the end of section 3).
Similar insights also apply to industries in which procuring several categories of products from
the same supplier allows a customer to save on operating costs. For example, in its decision on the
proposed merger between Aerospatiale-Alenia and De Havilland,42 the European Commission
mentions that the new entity would benefit from being the only one to offer regional aircraft
in all three relevant sizes, thus allowing "one-stop shopper" airlines to save on maintenance
and spare parts as well as on pilot training and certification. To see how the analysis can be
transposed in such industries, suppose for instance that L covers both segments A and B while S
covers B only, and that procuring both products from the same supplier involves a maintenance
cost f , while dealing with different suppliers increases the maintenance cost to f + t, where
t is customer-specific. Then, whenever active customers prefer procuring both products (e.g.,
because the products are complements, or because airlines cannot be viable without operating
aircraft in all relevant sizes), the same analysis as above applies, and L subsidizes again the
competitive product (and charges for example the full value for the bundle if f is constant and
the goods are complements, or mimics the pricing policy with asymmetric shopping costs if f is
proportional to t).
8 Conclusion
Large retailers, enjoying substantial market power in some local markets, often compete with
smaller retailers who carry a narrower range of products in a more efficient way. We find that
these large retailers can exercise their market power by adopting a loss-leading pricing strategy,
which consists of pricing below cost some of the products also offered by smaller rivals, and
raising the prices on the other products. In this way the large retailers can better discriminate
multi-stop shoppers from one-stop shoppers — and may even earn more profit than in the absence
42 See the decision of the European Commission of 2 October 1991 in case No. IV/M053 - Aerospatiale-Alenia/de
Havilland.
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of the more efficient rivals. Loss leading thus appears as an exploitative device, designed to
extract additional surplus from multi-stop shoppers, rather than as an exclusionary instrument
to foreclose the market, although the small rivals are hurt as a by-product of exploitation. We
show further that banning below-cost pricing increases consumer surplus, small rivals’ profits,
and social welfare.
Our analysis sheds a new light on the potential harm of loss leading and identifies the key
factors underlying it: asymmetry in the product range and heterogeneity in consumers’ shopping
patterns.43 While the insights are quite robust to variations in cost and demand conditions,
policy measures should however also take into account potential efficiency justifications, and
empirical studies are needed to assess the resulting balance. We have furthermore restricted
attention to individual unit demands, as this appears reasonable for groceries and other day-to-
day purchases, and also neglected any correlation between consumers’ valuations for the goods
and their shopping costs; whether our insights apply to market environments where consumers’
individual demands are elastic, or underlying characteristics (e.g., wealth) affect both shopping
costs and willingness to pay, is left to future research. Likewise, our framework focuses on
small retailers who offer higher quality and/or lower distribution cost, such as specialist chains
and hard discount stores, but it does not account for other categories of small stores, such
as convenience stores, who face higher distribution cost (and charge higher prices) but allow
consumers to save on shopping costs; we leave to future research the analysis of pricing strategies
in such instances.
Finally, while the analysis focuses mainly on retail markets, our insights apply as well to
industries where a firm, enjoying substantial market power in one segment, competes with more
efficient rivals in other segments, and procuring these products from the same supplier generates
customer-specific benefits. They also apply to complementary products, such as platforms and
applications. While some of these industries have hosted heated antitrust cases focusing on
predatory pricing or related conduct, our analysis provides an alternative rationale for below-
cost pricing based on exploitation rather than exclusion.
43 We have focused here on different shopping costs, which appear as a key factor for routine, repeated purchases.
Other sources of heterogeneity may be relevant for other types of purchases; for example, for less frequent, high
value purchases, information and search costs may play a more important role — and customers with lower search
costs are again likely to visit more stores. It would be interesting to study whether these alternative sources of
underlying heterogeneity yield similar or distinct insights.
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Appendices
A Quasi-concavity of profit functions
We check here the quasi-concavity of the profit functions. In the monopoly case, it is optimal
for L to choose rAL < wAL (otherwise, it would make no profit), which yields a profit:
Π(rAL) = rALF (wAL − rAL).
Differentiating with respect to rAL yields:
Π′ (rAL) = f(wAL − rAL)φ (rAL) ,
where the function φ (rAL) ≡ h(wAL − rAL) − rAL is strictly decreasing; therefore, the first-
order condition, which boils down to φ (rAL) = 0, has a unique solution r
m
AL = h (v
m
AL), where
vmAL = l
−1 (wAL),
44 and the profit function Π is strictly quasi-convave in the relevant range
rAL ≤ wAL. The solution r
m
AL thus constitutes a global optimum.
In regime L, as long as τ = wS − wL + rL − rS lies between 0 and vAL = wAL − rAL, L’s
profit can be expressed as:
ΠL (rAL, rL) = rALF (wAL − rAL)− rLF (wS −wL + rL − rS),
which is thus additively separable with respect to rAL and rL. Using the same argument as
above, the terms rALF (wAL − rAL) and −rLF (wS −wL + rL − rS) are moreover quasi-concave
in, respectively, rAL and −rL. It follows that L’s unique best response to rS is characterized
by rmAL = h(wAL − r
m
AL) and r
∗
L = −h(wS − wL + r
∗
L − rS). A similar reasoning applies to
regime S. Likewise, when the small retailer is a strategic player, its best response maximizes
ΠS = rSF (wS − wL + rL − rS), which is quasi-concave in rS , and is thus the solution to
r∗S = h(wS −wL + rL − r
∗
S).
B Proof of Proposition 1
We first show that, without loss of generality, we can focus on τ ∈ [0, vAL]. If τ > vAL (i.e.,
wS − wL + rL > wAL − rAL, or rL > r
′
L ≡ (wAL − rA − (wS −wL)) /2), there are no one-
stop shoppers: active consumers buy A from L and BS from S, and do so as long as 2t < vAS ;
44 Using rAL + vAL = wAL, the first-order condition can be written as h (vAL) = rAL = wAL − vAL, that is,
wAL = vAL + h (vAL) = l (vAL).
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however, keeping rA constant, decreasing rL to r
′
L such that τ
′ = v′AL does not affect the number
of active consumers (since vAS does not change), who still visit both stores as before. If instead
τ < 0 (i.e., rL < −wS − wL), there are no multi-stop shoppers: active consumers only visit L,
and do so as long as t < vAL; however, keeping rA constant, increasing rL to r
′
L = − (wS −wL)
yields τ ′ = 0 without affecting consumer behavior.
The optimal margins and profits for the regimes L and S are characterized in the text. The
loss-leading strategy is clearly preferable when vmAL ≥ wS , since it then gives L more profit
than the monopolistic profit ΠmAL, which exceeds the monopoly profit that could be achieved in
market A only (ΠmA ): Π
m
AL = maxr rF (wAL − r) > maxr rF (wA − r) = Π
m
A since wAL > wA.
We now show that the loss-leading strategy remains profitable when wAL ≥ wS > v
m
AL, where it
involves r∗L < 0 and r˜
∗
AL = wAL−wS. To see this, fixing r˜
∗
AL and using rA rather than rL as the
optimization variable, the margin on BL and the shopping cost threshold can be expressed as:
rL = rAL − rA = wAL −wS − rA, τ = wS −wL + rL = wAL −wL − rA.
Then, the maximum profit Π˜∗L can then be written as:
Π˜∗L = r˜
∗
AL (F (v˜
∗
AL)− F (τ
∗)) + r∗AF (τ
∗)
= (wAL −wS) (F (wS)− F (τ
∗)) + r∗AF (τ
∗)
= max
rA
{(wAL −wS) (F (wS)− F (wAL −wL − rA)) + rAF (wAL −wL − rA)}
≥ (wAL −wS) (F (wS)− F (wAL −wL − r
m
A )) + r
m
AF (wAL −wL − r
m
A )
= (wAL −wS) (F (wS)− F (v
m
A )) + Π
m
A .
Since wS > v
m
AL = l
−1(wAL) > l
−1(wAL − wL) = v
m
A , it follows that Π˜
∗
L ≥ Π
m
A whenever
wAL ≥ wS .
Conversely, when wAL < wS , we have:
Π˜∗L = (wAL −wS) (F (wS)− F (wAL −wL − r˜
∗
A)) + r˜
∗
AF (wAL −wL − r˜
∗
A)
< r˜∗AF (wAL −wL − r˜
∗
A)
≤ ΠmA ,
where the first inequality stems from wS > wAL (> wAL −wL − r˜
∗
A).
Finally, in the limit case where wAL = wS , using BL as a loss leader amounts to monopolizing
product A. Notice that offering vAL = wS requires rAL = wAL−vAL = 0, or rA = −rL, thus the
margin on A reflects the subsidy on BL. In this case, the optimal subsidy strategy maximizes
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−rLF (τ) = −rLF (wS −wL + rL) = rAF (wAL −wL − rA). Consumers are also indifferent be-
tween these two strategies: in both cases they face the same price for A. While the loss-leading
strategy may yield a lower price for BL (in the monopolization scenario, L may actually stop
carrying BL), this does not affect multi-stop shoppers (who do not buy BL from L), whereas
one-stop shoppers are indifferent between buying A and BL from L or BS only from S.
C Proof of Proposition 2
We derive here the conditions under which the loss leading outcome (rˆ∗AL = r
m
AL and rˆ
∗
L = −rˆ
∗
S =
−h (τˆ∗), where τˆ∗ = j−1 (wS −wL)) forms a Nash equilibrium, before checking the uniqueness
of the equilibrium. To attract one-stop shoppers, L must offer a better value than S:45
vmAL ≥ vˆ
∗
S ≡ wS − h (τˆ
∗) . (12)
This condition implies vmAL ≥ vˆ
∗
S > vˆ
∗
S − vˆ
∗
L = τˆ
∗, which in turn implies wAL > wS :
wAL = l (v
m
AL) ≥ l (vˆ
∗
S) = vˆ
∗
S + h (vˆ
∗
S) = wS − h (τˆ
∗) + h (vˆ∗S) > wS .
Moreover, while L has no incentive to exclude its rival, since it earns more profit than
a pure monopolist, S may want to attract one-stop shoppers by reducing rS so as to offer
vS ≥ v
m
AL. Such a deviation allows S to attract all consumers (one-stop or multi-stop shoppers)
with shopping costs t ≤ vS and thus yields a profit Π
d
S (vS) ≡ rSF (vS) = (wS − vS)F (vS). It is
easy to check that the best deviation of this type is to offer vdS = v
m
AL (or slightly above v
m
AL, if
one-stop shoppers are indifferent between two stores in this case). To see this, note that ΠdS (vS)
is quasi-convave in vS and let v
m
S denote the optimal value of vS. Since the candidate equilibrium
margin, vˆ∗S , maximizes (wS −wL + rˆ
∗
L − vS)F (vS), where wS−wL+ rˆ
∗
L < wS, a simple revealed
argument yields vmS < vˆ
∗
S . Thus, increasing vS further above v
m
AL > vˆ
∗
S would reduce S’s profit
monotonically, and it is then optimal for S to offer precisely vdS = v
m
AL, which gives S a profit
equal to ΠdS (v
m
AL) = (wS − v
m
AL)F (v
m
AL). Thus, the loss-leading outcome is immune to such a
deviation if and only if
Πˆ∗S ≡ h (τˆ
∗)F (τˆ∗) ≥ ΠˆdS ≡ (wS − v
m
AL)F (v
m
AL). (13)
45 As before, this is equivalent to wAL−wL− rˆ
∗
A = v
m
AL− vˆ
∗
L ≥ vˆ
∗
S− vˆ
∗
L = τˆ
∗ (> 0), which implies that multi-stop
shoppers are indeed willing to buy A when visiting L. Moreover, this condition also implies vmAL > vˆ
∗
S − vˆ
∗
L =
τˆ∗ (> 0).
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This condition can be further written as:
Ψ(wAL;wS) ≡ (wS − v
m
AL)F (v
m
AL) ≤ Πˆ
∗
S , (14)
where vmAL = l
−1(wAL) and thus satisfies v
m
AL + h (v
m
AL) = wAL. Therefore:
∂Ψ
∂wAL
(wAL;wS) = ((wS − v
m
AL) f(v
m
AL)− F (v
m
AL))
dvmAL
dwAL
= (wS − v
m
AL − h(v
m
AL))
f(vmAL)
1 + h′(vmAL)
= (wS −wAL)
f(vmAL)
1 + h′(vmAL)
.
It follows that, in the range wAL ≥ wS , Ψ(wAL;wS) decreases with wAL (and strictly so for
wAL > wS). Thus, condition (13) amounts to wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS , wL), where wˆAL (wS , wL) is
the unique solution to Ψ(wAL;wS) = Πˆ
∗
S. To show that this solution exists and lies above wS ,
note first that Ψ becomes negative for wAL > l (wS) (since then v
m
AL = l
−1 (wAL) > wS), and
that for wAL = wS , Ψ(wAL;wS) = (wAL − v
m
AL)F (v
m
AL) = Π
m
AL = maxv (wAL − v)F (v); since
wAL > wS −wL + rˆ
∗
L, this exceeds Πˆ
∗
S = maxτ (wS −wL + rˆ
∗
L − τ)F (τ).
Finally, in the range wAL > wS (> wS − vˆ
∗
L), a simple revealed argument yields:
τˆ∗ = argmax
v
(wS − vˆ
∗
L − τ)F (τ) < v
m
AL = argmax
v
(wAL − v)F (v) .
Therefore, (13), which is equivalent to:
vmAL ≥ wS −
h (τˆ∗)F (τˆ∗)
F (vmAL)
, (15)
implies (12). The two conditions (12) and (13) thus boil down to wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS, wL).
It remains to show that wˆAL (wS, wL) increases with wS . Differentiating wˆAL (wS , wL) with
respect to wS yields:
∂wˆAL
∂wS
=
∂Ψ
∂wS
−
∂Πˆ∗
S
∂wS
− ∂Ψ
∂wAL
,
where the denominator is positive in the relevant range, whereas the numerator is equal to:
∂Ψ
∂wS
−
∂Πˆ∗S
∂wS
= F (vmAL)−
d (h (τˆ∗)F (τˆ∗))
dτˆ∗
∂τˆ∗
∂wS
= F (vmAL)−
1 + h′ (τˆ∗)
1 + 2h′ (τˆ∗)
F (τˆ∗) ,
which is positive since vmAL > τˆ
∗.
We now show that no other equilibrium exists when wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS, wL). First, we turn
to regime S, in which one-stop shoppers patronize S (vAL < vS), and show that there is no
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such equilibrium when wAL > wS . In this regime, L faces only a demand F (vA) for A from
multi-stop shoppers, where vA = wAL − wL − rA, and thus makes a profit equal to rAF (vA).
L could however deviate and attract one-stop shoppers by reducing rL (keeping rA and thus
vA constant) so as to offer v
′
AL = vS (or slightly above vS). Doing so would not change the
number of multi-stop shoppers, since τ ′ = vS − v
′
L = v
′
AL − v
′
L = v
′
A = vA, and L would obtain
the same margin, rA, from those consumers. But it would now attract one-stop shoppers (those
for which vA ≤ t ≤ vAL = vS), from which L could earn a total margin r
′
AL = wAL − v
′
AL =
wAL − vS = wAL − wS + rS . Since any candidate equilibrium requires rS ≥ 0, the deviation
would be profitable when wAL > wS .
Second, consider the boundary between the two regimes, in which one-stop shoppers are in-
different between visiting L or S (vAL = vS). Note that there must exist some active consumers,
since either retailer can profitably attract consumers by charging a small positive margin; there-
fore, we must have vAL = vS > 0. Suppose that all active consumers are multi-stop shoppers
(in which case L only sells A while S sells BS to all consumers), which requires vAL = vS ≤ τ .
Applying the same logic as in the beginning of Appendix B, we can without loss of generality
focus on the case vAL = vS = τ . It is then profitable for L to transform some multi-stop shop-
pers into one-stop shoppers, by reducing its margin on BL to r
′
L = wL−ε > 0 and increasing rA
by ε, so as to keep vAL constant: doing so does not affect the total number of active consumers,
but transforms those whose shopping cost lies between τ ′ = vS − v
′
L = τ − ε and τ into one-stop
shoppers. While L obtains the same margin on them (since r′AL = rAL), it now obtains a higher
margin r′A > rA on the remaining multi-stop shoppers.
Therefore, some consumers must visit a single store, and by assumption must be indifferent
between visiting either store (vAL = vS). Suppose now some one-stop shoppers visit S. Since
S can avoid making losses, we must then have rS ≥ 0. But then, vAL = vS implies rAL =
rS+wAL−wS > 0 and, thus, it would be profitable for L to reduce rAL slightly, so as to attract
all one-stop shoppers. Therefore, all one-stop shoppers must go to L if rAL > 0. Conversely, we
must have rS ≤ 0, otherwise S would benefit from slightly reducing its margin so as to attract
all one-stop shoppers. Therefore, in any candidate equilibrium such that vAL = vS > 0, either:
• There are some multi-stop shoppers (i.e. τ > 0) and thus rS = 0; but then, slightly
increasing rS would allow S to keep attracting some multi-stop shoppers and obtain a
positive profit, a contradiction.
• Or, all consumers buy both products from L, which requires rL ≤ rS − (wS −wL) ≤
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− (wS −wL) < 0. But then, increasing rL to r
′
L = rS − (wS −wL)+ ε and reducing rA by
the same amount (so as to keep rAL constant) would lead those consumers with t < τ
′ = ε
to buy BS from S, allowing L to avoid granting them the subsidy rL.
It follows that there is no equilibrium such that vAL = vS .
Finally, loss leading (in which L not only offers, but actually sells below cost) can only
arise when L sells to one-stop shoppers, which thus requires vAL ≥ vS . But this cannot be an
equilibrium when wAL < wˆAL (wS , wL), since: (i) in the range vAL > vS, the only such candidate
is the above described loss-leading outcome, which requires wAL ≥ wˆAL (wS , wL); and (ii) as
just discussed, no equilibrium exists in the boundary case vAL = vS.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Stackelberg leadership. Suppose that L benefits from a first-mover advantage: it sets its prices
first, and then, having observed these prices, S sets its own price. Retail prices are often strategic
complements, and it is indeed the case here for S in the B segment: as noted before, S’s best
response, rˆS (rL), increases with rL. Thus, in the case of "normal competition" in the B market,
L would exploit its first-mover advantage by increasing its price for BL, so as to encourage its
rival to increase its own price and relax the competitive pressure. In contrast, here L has an
incentive to decrease rL even further. This leads S to decrease its own price, which allows L to
raise the price for A. To see this, note that L’s Stackelberg profit from a loss-leading strategy
can be written as:
ΠSL (rL) = Π
m
AL − rLF (τˆ (rL)) = Π
m
AL − rLF (wS −wL + rL − rˆS (rL)) .
Denoting by rSL the optimal Stackelberg margin and using rˆS (rˆ
∗
L) = rˆ
∗
S , where rˆ
∗
L and rˆ
∗
S are
the equilibrium margins when L moves simultaneously with S, we have:
−rSLF
(
wS −wL + r
S
L − rˆS
(
rSL
))
≥ −rˆ∗LF (wS −wL + rˆ
∗
L − rˆS (rˆ
∗
L))
≥ −rSLF
(
wS −wL + r
S
L − rˆ
∗
S
)
,
where the second inequality stems from the fact that rˆ∗L constitutes L’s best response to r
∗
S .
Since −rSL > 0 and F (·) and rˆS (·) are both increasing, this in turn implies r
S
L ≤ rˆ
∗
L. This
inequality is moreover strict, since (using τˆ (rˆ∗L) = τˆ
∗):
(
ΠSL
)′
(rˆ∗L) = −F (τˆ
∗)− rˆ∗Lf (τˆ
∗)
(
1− rˆ′S (rˆ
∗
L)
)
= rˆ∗Lf (τˆ
∗) rˆ′S (rˆ
∗
L) < 0.
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Thus, L sells the competitive product BL further below-cost, compared with what it would do
in the absence of a first-mover advantage: rSL < rˆ
∗
L.
Entry accommodation. Suppose now that the presence of S is uncertain. To capture this
possibility, assume that S incurs a fixed cost for entering the market, γ, which is ex ante
distributed according to a cumulative distribution function Fγ (·), and consider the following
timing:
• In stage 1, L chooses its prices.
• In stage 2, the entry cost is realized, and S chooses whether to enter; if it enters, it then
sets its own price.
If entry were certain, maximizing its Stackelberg profit would lead L to adopt rSL. But now,
S enters only when its best response profit, ΠˆS (rL), exceeds the realized cost γ, which occurs
with probability ρ (rL) ≡ Fγ
(
ΠˆS (rL)
)
. L’s ex ante profit is therefore equal to
ΠˆSL (rL) = Π
m
AL + ρ (rL)Π
S
L (rL) .
The optimal margin, rˆSL, thus satisfies
ρ
(
rˆSL
)
ΠSL
(
rˆSL
)
≥ ρ
(
rSL
)
ΠSL
(
rSL
)
≥ ρ
(
rSL
)
ΠSL
(
rˆSL
)
,
which implies
ρ
(
rˆSL
)
≥ ρ
(
rSL
)
.
Since Fγ and ΠˆS are both increasing in rL, so is ρ and thus rˆ
S
L ≥ r
S
L. This inequality is moreover
strict, since
(
ΠˆSL
)′ (
rSL
)
= ρ′
(
rSL
)
ΠSL
(
rSL
)
+ ρ
(
rSL
) (
ΠSL
)′ (
rSL
)
= ρ′
(
rSL
)
ΠSL
(
rSL
)
> 0.
Therefore, when L’s comparative advantage leads it to adopt a loss-leading strategy, it limits
the subsidy on B so as to increase the likelihood of entry: rˆSL > r
S
L.
E Proof of Proposition 4
In the equilibrium where L attracts one-stop shoppers in the absence of a ban, L must offer
a higher value than S: vAL = v
m
AL > vˆ
∗
S = wS − rˆ
∗
S , and S must moreover not be tempted
to deviate and attract one-stop shoppers, which boils down to Πˆ∗S = h (τˆ
∗)F (τˆ∗) ≥ ΠˆdS =
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(wS − v
m
AL)F (v
m
AL). If L keeps attracting one-stop shoppers (i.e., vAL > vS) when loss leading
is banned, then the unique candidate equilibrium is rAL = r
m
AL, rL = 0 and rˆ
b
S = h (τ
∗), where
τ∗ = l−1 (wS −wL).
We show now this candidate equilibrium prevails when loss-leading would arise if below-cost
pricing were allowed. Note that, since S increases its price (i.e., rˆbS = h (τ
∗) > rˆ∗S = h (τˆ
∗)),
it offers less value (vS = vˆ
b
S ≡ wS − rˆ
b
S < vˆ
∗
S), and thus L indeed attracts one-stop shoppers:
vAL = v
m
AL > (vˆ
∗
S >) vˆ
b
S . Furthermore, as S must again offer at least vS = vAL to attract one-stop
shoppers, it still cannot obtain more than ΠˆdS by deviating in this way. Therefore, since S now
obtains more profit (Π∗S ≡ h (τ
∗)F (τ∗) > Πˆ∗S = h (τˆ
∗)F (τˆ∗)), it is less tempted to deviate:
Π∗S >
(
Πˆ∗S >
)
ΠˆdS. It follows that the conditions for sustaining the above equilibrium are less
stringent than that for the loss-leading equilibrium.
F Proof of Proposition 5
We focus on the large retailer’s strategies, taking the strategies of the smaller retailer(s) as given;
thus, whether the smaller rival is a strategic player or a competitive fringe does not matter here.
L’s profit can be written as (see Figure 1):
ΠL = rALDAL + rADAS = rAL
∫ vAL
τ
G (xAL (t)) f (t) dt+ rA
∫ τ
0
G (xA (t)) f (t) dt.
To characterize the equilibrium values of rL and rAL, we now consider the impact of a small
change on either variable.
Consider first a modification of rA by dr, adjusting rL by −dr so as to keep rAL constant.
Such a change does not affect the behavior of one-stop shoppers (it has no impact on vAL and
xAL (t)), but (see Figure 1):
• It affects multi-shop shoppers: for t < τ , the marginal consumer indifferent between buying
A from L or patronizing S only becomes x = xA (t)−σdr; therefore, L loses σg (xA (t)) dr
consumers, on which it no longer earns the margin rA. L however increases its margin by
dr on the mass G (xA (t)) of consumers that buy A. Thus, the overall impact of such an
adjustment on multi-stop shoppers is equal to∫ τ
0
[G (xA (t))− σrAg (xA (t))]f (t) dtdr.
• In addition, it alters the choice between one-stop and multi-stop shopping: those consumers
for which t ∈ [τ − dr, τ ] and x ≤ xA (t) turn to one-stop shopping and now buy B as well
as A from L1, which (noting that xA (τ) = xˆ) brings a gain rLG (xˆ) f (τ) dr.
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These effects must cancel out in equilibrium, which yields∫ τ
0
[σrA − k (xA (t))] g (xA (t)) f (t)dt = rLG (xˆ) f (τ) .
Likewise, adjusting slightly rAL by dr, keeping rA constant (and thus changing rL by dr as well)
does not affect the behavior of multi-stop shoppers (it has no impact on vAS and xA (t)), but:
• It affects one-stop shoppers: for t > τ , the marginal shopper becomes x = xAL (t)− σdr,
and the resulting change in profit is∫ vAL
τ
[G (xAL (t))− σrALg (xAL (t))] f (t) dtdr.
• In addition, those consumers for which t ∈ [τ, τ + dr] and x ≤ xAL (t) become multi-stop
shoppers and stop buying B from L, which (noting that xAL (τ ) = xˆ) brings a net effect
−rLG (xˆ) f (τ) dr.
In equilibrium, these effects must again cancel each other, which yields∫ vAL
τ
[σrAL − k (xAL (t))] g (xAL (t)) f (t) dt = −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) .
Therefore, if in equilibrium rL were non-negative, we would have∫ τ
0
[σrA − k (xA (t))] g (xA (t)) f (t)dt ≥ 0 ≥
∫ vAL
τ
[σrAL − k (xAL (t))] g (xAL (t)) f (t)dt,
that is, rA would exceed a weighted average of k (xA (t)) /σ for t ∈ [0, τ ], whereas rAL would
be lower than a weighted average of k (xAL (t)) /σ for t ∈ [τ, vAL]. But since k (xA (t)) and
k (xAL (t)) decrease as t increases (k (.) increases by assumption, and both xA (t) and xAL (t)
decrease by construction), this would imply rA > rAL, a contradiction. Therefore, in equilibrium,
rL < 0.
If the shopping cost t is distributed over some interval [0, T ], where T > τ to ensure that
large retailers still attract some one-stop shoppers, the first-order conditions become:∫ τ
0
[σrA − k (xA (t))] g (xA (t)) f (t)dt = rLG (xˆ) f (τ) ,∫
min{vAL,T}
τ
[σrAL − k (xAL (t))] g (xAL (t)) f (t)dt = −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) ;
it thus suffices to replace vAL with min {vAL, T} in the above reasoning.
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G Proof of Proposition 6
Consider first (symmetric) equilibria of type M , in which large retailers compete only for multi-
stop shoppers. In the absence of any bound on shopping costs, the demands for assortments
A1L1 and A1S in such equilibrium, where rA1L1 = rA2L2 = rAL and rL1 = rL2 = rL (and thus
rA1 = rA2 = rA), can be expressed as:
DAS =
∫ τ
0
G (xˆA (t)) f (t) dt and DAL =
∫ vAL
τ
G (xAL (t)) f (t) dt,
where as before τ = vS−vL and xAL (t) = σ (vAL −max {t, vS}), and xˆA (t) ≡ σ (vA −max {t, vˆA}) =
min {1/2, xA (t) = σ (vA − t)}.
Applying the same approach as above, starting from a candidate symmetric equilibrium,
consider first a small change dr in rA1 , adjusting rL1 by −dr so as to keep rA1L1 constant:
• For t < vˆA, the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying A from L1 or L2 is
such that:
wA − (rA + dr)−
x
σ
= wA − rA −
1− x
σ
,
or:
x =
1
2
−
σdr
2
.
The overall impact on L1’s profit is thus:∫ vˆA
0
[G (xˆA (t))−
σ
2
rAg (xˆA (t))]f (t) dtdr.
• For vˆA < t < τ , the marginal consumer indifferent between buying A from L1 or patron-
izing S becomes x = xA (t)− σdr, and the resulting impact on profit is:∫ τ
vˆA
[G (xˆA (t))− σrAg (xˆA (t))]f (t)dtdr.
• In addition, those consumers for which t ∈ [τ − dr, τ ] and x ≤ xˆA (t) turn to one-stop shop-
ping and now buy B as well as A from L1, which brings a additional profit rLG (xˆ) f (τ)dr.
Therefore, in equilibrium, we must have:∫ τ
0
[σrA − ηA (t)] gˆ (xˆA (t)) f (t)dt = rLG (xˆ) f (τ) , (16)
where (using xˆA (t) = 1/2 for t ≤ vˆA):
ηA (t) ≡

 2k (xˆA (t)) for t < vˆAk (xˆA (t)) for t > vˆA and gˆ (x) ≡


g (1/2)
2
for x = 1
2
g (x) for x < 1
2
.
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Consider now a small change dr in rA1L1, keeping rA1 constant (and thus adjusting rL1 by
dr as well):
• for t > τ , the marginal (one-stop) shopper becomes x = xAL (t)− σdr and the impact on
the profit is ∫ vAL
τ
[G (xAL (t))− σrALg (xAL (t))] f (t)dtdr;
• in addition, those consumers for which t ∈ [τ, τ + dr] and x ≤ xAL (t) become multi-stop
shoppers and stop buying B from L1, which brings a net loss −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) dr.
In equilibrium, we must therefore have∫ vAL
τ
[σrAL − ηAL (t)] g (xAL (t)) f (t) dt = −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) , (17)
where ηAL (t) ≡ k (xAL (t)).
Thus, if rL were non-negative, the two conditions (16) and (17) would imply
∫ τ
0
[σrA − ηA (t)] gˆ (xˆA (t)) f (t)dt ≥ 0 ≥
∫ vAL
τ
[σrAL − ηAL (t)] g (xAL (t)) f (t) dt,
where ηA and ηAL decrease as t increases, and coincide for t = τ ; this, in turn, would imply
rA > rAL, a contradiction. A similar argument applies when the shopping cost t is distributed
over some interval [0, T ].
The same approach can be used for (symmetric) equilibria of type O, in which large retailers
compete as well for one-stop shoppers. In the absence of any bound on shopping costs, the
demands for assortments A1L1 and A1S in such equilibrium can be expressed as
DAS =
∫ τ
0
G
(
1
2
)
f (t)dt and DAL =
∫ vAL
τ
G (xˆAL (t)) f (t)dt,
where xˆAL (t) ≡ σ (vA −max {t, vˆAL}) = min {1/2, xAL (t) = σ (vAL − t)}.
Following a small change dr in rA1 , adjusting rL1 by −dr so as to keep rA1L1 constant, we
have:
• for t < τ , the marginal consumer indifferent between buying A from L1 or L2 becomes
1/2− σdr/2;
• in addition, those consumers for which t ∈ [τ − dr, τ ] and x ≤ xˆA (t) become one-stop
shoppers.
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Therefore, in equilibrium we must have∫ τ
0
[σrA − ηˆA] gˆ(
1
2
)f (t)dt = rLG
(
1
2
)
f (τ) ,
where ηˆA ≡ 2k (1/2) and gˆ(
1
2
) = g (1/2) /2.
Likewise, following a small change dr in rA1L1 , keeping rA1 constant (and thus changing rL1
by dr as well), we have:
• for τ < t < vˆAL, the marginal (one-stop) shopper becomes x = xAL (t)− σdr/2;
• for vˆAL < t < vAL, the marginal (one-stop) shopper becomes x = xAL (t)− σdr;
• in addition, those consumers for which t ∈ [τ, τ + dr] and x ≤ xˆAL (t) become multi-stop
shoppers: they stop buying B from L1.
We must therefore have∫ vAL
τ
[σrAL − ηˆAL (t)] gˆ (xˆAL (t)) f (t) dt = −rLG (xˆ) f (τ) ,
where
ηˆAL (t) ≡
2k (xˆAL (t)) for t < vˆAL
k (xˆAL (t)) for t > vˆAL
,
and gˆ (x) is defined above with xˆAL (t) = 1/2 for τ ≤ t ≤ vˆAL. Thus, if rL were non-negative,
the above two conditions would imply:∫ τ
0
[σrA − ηˆA] gˆ(
1
2
)f (t) dt ≥ 0 ≥
∫ vAL
τ
[σrAL − ηˆAL (t)] gˆ (xˆAL (t)) f (t) dt,
and a contradiction follows, since xˆAL (t) ≤ 1/2, with a strict inequality for t > vˆAL, and thus
ηˆAL (t) ≤ 2k (xˆAL (t)) ≤ ηˆA, with again a strict inequality for t > vˆAL. A similar argument
applies again when the shopping cost t is distributed over some interval [0, T ].46
46 That is, loss leading arises as long as the aggregate demand is elastic; if instead T < vˆAL, then all consumers
buy both goods, in which case ηˆAL (.) = ηˆA and gˆ (xˆAL (t)) = gˆ
(
1
2
)
, and rL = 0.
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